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ENEMY VESSELS AND CARGO
THE "BLONDE" AND OTHER SHIPS
([1922] 1 A. C. 313)

ON APPEAL FROl\1 THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND

Prize court-Outbreak of war-German ships detained in British
ports-Requisition-Owners' rights to release-Applicability of
Hague convention-German misconduct of war-Effect of peace
treaty-Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, annex 3, article 1;
Part X, article 297-Hague convention No. VI, articles 1, 2, 6.
Article 2 of Hague convention No. VI, provided that a belligerent
may not confiscate an enemy merchant ship detained in the
belligerent's port at the commencement of hostilities, but
may "merely detain it, on condition of restoring it after the
war, without payment of compensation, or he may rertuisition it on condition of payment of compensation."
The applicability of the above article between two belligerents does
not depend upon whether they have mutually agreed to
allow days of grace as contemplated in article 1; article 2
is obligatory, while article 1 is optional. Whatever may
be the true meaning of the condition in article 6 that the
convention is to apply only "if all the belligerents are
parties," Great Britain during the recent war frequently
recognized that the convention was binding, and thereby
waived the right to rely upon nonfulfillment of the condition.
The conduct of Germany during the war in committing many acts
in flagrant defiance of th~ Hague conventions does not prevent article 2 of the sixth convention from being binding
upon Great Britain. Apart from considerations of municipal law, it is not the function of a prize court, as such, to
be a censor of the general conduct of a belligerent, as distinct
from his dealings in the particular matters before the court,
or to sanction disregard of solemn obligations by one belligerent because it reprehends the whole behavior of the other.
Where a detained ship has been requisitioned under Order XXIX of
the Prize Court Rules, 1914, and sunk, the German owneJ, if
entitled to restoration under article 2, is entitled to the
appraised value as the compensation provided for by
article 2, and that right exists although the ship was sunk
by German hostile action.
Part VIII, annex 3, article 1, of the treaty of Versailles operates to
transfer to the allied and associated powers the propert~T
in all German ships of 1,600 tons and upward. The former
owners of ships of that tonnage therefore have no locus
standi before the prize court under article 2 of the sixth
convention, nor right to discuss how those powers may deal
inter se with the ships. But annex 3 effects no transfer of
ships of lesser tonnage, at least until selected for surrender.
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Article 297 of the treaty does not annul or modify the obligations
under the convention. The claim of Great Britain thereunder to retain ships to the release of which the German
owners are entitled under article 2 of the convention is not
one for determination by the prize court, but orders of the
prize court for release should contain a provision to prevent
rights under the treaty from being defeated.
Three ships, each of under 1,600 tons gross, owned by a Danzig
corporation and detained in a British port at the commencement of hostilities, were requisitioned under Order XXIX
for the service of the Crown; while so requisitioned one of
the ships was lost by grounding, and one by German
hostile action. Applying the various considerations above
stated, an order was advised that the appraised value of
the two lost ships, and the ship remaining in specie, be
released to the custodian of enemy property to be delivered to the Danzig corporation, if after six months no
proceedings had been begun for delivery to the Crown,
otherwise to abide the final determinations of those proceedings.
Judgment of the prize court [1921] P. 155 reversed.
Further advised, on petitions, that certain German ships of 1,600
tons gross and upward detained as above should be released to the Crown, the orders for detention being discharged.

Appeal from a judgment of the admiralty division (in
prize) delivered on January 23, 1921; 1 also, petitions
and cross petitions for the release or condemnation of
enemy ships.
The appellants, a corporation registered at Danzig,
appealed from a decree of the president (Sir Henry Duke)
condemning the steamships Blonde, Hercules, and Prosper.
The ships were registered at Danzig, and were respectively of 613, 1,095, and 759 tons gross. They were
seized in British ports in August, 19~4, upon the commencement of hostilities with Germany. In January,
1915, the prize court made orders in the form in The
Chile 2 f<;>r the detention of the ships until further orders.
They were requisitioned for the service of His Majesty
by orders made by the prize court under Order XXIX
of the Prize Court Rules, 1914. While under requisition the Blonde had been lost by grounding and the .
Hercules \Vas sunk by an enemy torpedo.
Upon application by the procurator general in 1920
for condemnation of the ships, the president (Sir Henry
Duke) held that the special provisions in the treaty of
Versailles as to Danzig left the appellants, for. the pur1

[1921] P. 155.

2

[1914] P. 212.
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pose under consideration, in the same position as if
they had remained German subjects; and, follo\ving
his decision in The Marie Leonhardt/ he held that in
the absence of agreement between Great Britain and
Germany to the contrary, German merchant ships
found in British ports at the commencement of hostilities were subject to condemnation. The learned president accordingly condemned the ships; the present
appeal was from that decree.
There were also before the privy council petitions and
cross petitions relating to the Gutenfels and certain other
German steamships. In the case of each of these ships
the privy council upon appeal 4 had made order, similar
to the order in The Ohile,S for detention until further
orders. The present petitions and cross petitions were
on the part of the respective owners for the release of
the ships, and on the part of the Crown for their condemnation. Each of these ships was of over 1,600 tons
gross. The arguments were heard together with those
in the appeal, and the present judgment of the judiciar
committee in the appeal deals also with the petitions and
cross petitions.
The Hague Convention, 1907, No. VI, provided (intertio~a~¥~Conven
alia) as follows: 6 Article 1: ''When a merchant ship
belonging to one of the belligerent powers is at the
commencement of hostilities in an enemy port, it is
desirable that it should be allow·ed to depart freely,
either imn1ediately, or after a reasonable number of
days of grace * * * " Article 2: "A merchant ship,
which, O\ving to circumstances beyond its control, n1ay
have been unable to leave the enemy port \Vithin the
period contemplated in the preceding article, or which
\Vas not allowed to leave, may not be confiscated. The
belligerent may merely detain it, on condition of restoring it after the v;ar, \Vithout payment of compensation, or he may requisition it on condition of paying
compensation." Article 6: "The provisions of the present
convention do not apply except between contracting
powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties
to the convention."
a [1921] P. 1.
4 E. g. [1916] 2 A. C. 112; [1918] A. C. 500 and 50ln.
~ [1914] p. 212.
6 The official English translation aooears in thA Blue
(1908) I Cd. 4175.]

Book, Miscellaneous, No. 6
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safu~~~ty of Ver-

Argument
appellants.

By the treaty of Versailles, 1920, Part VIII, annex 3,
Article 1, Germany ceded to the allied and associated
powers all German merchant ships of 1,600 gross tons and
upward, and an unascertained moiety of certain smaller
ships. By Part X., Article 297, the allied and associated
powers reserved the right to retain and liquidate all
property, rights, and interests witnin their territories
belonging to German nationals. By Part III, Articles
100-109, Danzig was constituted a free state, and special
provisions "\vere made as to property within its territory.
By Article 105 the ordinary residents of Danzig "\vere to
lose their German nationality, in order to become nationals
of Danzig.
for
1921, October 28, 31 ,· November 1. Sir John Simon,
K. C., and Inskip, K. C., (Balloch "\vith them) for the
appellants. The appellants are entitled to the release of
the Blonde, and to the appraised value of the Prosper and
Hercules under Article 2 of Hague Convention No. VI.
That article applies whether or not there was an agreement between Great Britain and Germany to allo\v days
of grace as contemplated by Article 1. That point was
raised in argument in The Gutenfels; 7 it "\vas alluded to in
the judgment but not decided. In The Turul 8 the
judicial committee regarded Article 2 as not being dependent upon Article 1. The appellants' contention on
this point was not urged before the president, because in
The Marie Leonhardt, 9 and other cases the president had
given effect to a different view. Apart from the convention, the diplomatic correspondence between Great
Britain and Germany during the early months of the \var
amounted to a mutual agreement to restore ships detained
in port at the outbreak of war. Article 6 does not prevent the convention from applying. Both Great Britain
and Germany were parties to it when the ships "\vere
detained; it is not material that certain countries \Vhich
became belligerents during its progress \Vere not parties.
A contrary view \vould lead to curious results, as was
pointed out in The Jfowe. 10 The convention rested
principally upon compromise, and could not be expected
to exhibit the comprehensiveness of a code: Procurator in
Egypt v. Deu.tsches · J(ohlen Depot. 11 The right to restora~

7 [1916]

2 A. C. 112, 116, 119.

a [1919] A. C. 515, 518.
g [1919] p. 1,

10

11

[1915) p. 1, 12.
[1919] A. C. 291, 301.
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tion under the convention or agreement is not affected by
the provisions for the cession of ships and property contained in the treaty of Versailles. By the treaty the
ships became vested in nationals of the Free State of
Danzig created by it, and no right to condemn arose till a
later date. The effect of the treaty was to recognize that
· the property of the appellants as a Danzig corporation
was free from the incubus of German ownership. In any
case the provision as to the cessi(i)n of ships does not apply,
since all these ships are under 1,600 tons gross. Having
regard to Order XXIX, Rule 4, of the Prize Court Rules;
1914, the appellants are entitled to the appraised value ·
of the ships sunk while requisitioned.
Sir Ernest Pollock, S. G. (Sir Gordon 1-Ieward, A. G., cr!~~ment
and Wylie with him) for procurator general, respondent
to the cross appeals. The three ships, as enemy ships
seized in port at the outbreak of war, are subject to
condemnation in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary: Lindo v. Rodney. 12 There 'vas no agreement
to the contrary by virtue of either the convention, or the
correspondence relied on. Articles 1 and 2 of the convention must be read together; article 2 does not apply
unless an agreement has been made as to days of grace.
That view was conceded in The Marie Leonhardt 3 ; there
is no decision of the judicial committee to the contrary.
Further, the convention did not apply because the condition in article 6, namely, that all the belligerents should
be parties, was not fulfilled. The United States were not
parties; nor were Serbia, or Montenegro, all of which
countries were belligerents. The words ''all the belligerents" in article 6 can not be limited to those who were
belligerents at the time of the seizure. That vie'v 'vas
indicated in The Mowe. 13 The correspondence r elied on
did not amount to the agreement alleged. The essential
character of agreements of this kind is reciprocity: T he
Santa Oruz. 14 (1) In The Gute71:{els 15 it was said that the
convention involved a "reciprocal obligation,". and the
question whether article 2 applied 'vas left open to see
whether Germany observed her position of reciprocity.
Germany did not do so. As appears from a communication to Madrid in October, 1915, Germany planned to
recover retained ships visiting neu tral ports 'vhile requisitioned. That 'vas a repudiation of article 2, ,vhich
[1921] p. 1.
(1782) 2 Doug. 212n.
n [1915] P. 1.

3

12

u (1708) 1 C. Rob. 49, 62.
[1916] 2 A. C. 112, 119.

16

for
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recognized the right to req~isition retained ships. By a
note addressed to Sian1 on March 30, 1917, Germany
maintained, in ans,ver to neutral protests, that the convention was not binding upon any of the belligerents.
These repudiations put an end to any obligations on the
part of Great Britain to Germany under the convention,
or under the agreement, if there was one. Further, in
the course of the war Germany by her conduct showed
an intention not to be bound by any convention or
agreement. 16 That released the obligation of this country. It is not contended that there arose a right to
· retaliate, but that there ceased to be that continued reciprocity by Germany which was a condition to the convention being binding. The observations in The Nereide 11
are therefore not applicable. The appellants were German nationals until the treaty made them nationals of
Danzig; for the purpose now considered they are in the
same position as if they were still Germans.
Sir John Simon, K. C., in reply: The prize court is
not entitled to survey the conduct of Germany to see if
the sixth convention should be applied. There is no
evidence that Germany refused to be bound by article 2.
The claim to retain the ships under the treaty is not one
for the prize court to determine.
Upon the petitions and cross petitions there appeared:
Sir Gordon Hewart, A. G.; Sir Ernest Pollock, S. G.,
with Darby, Wylie, Trehern, Pearce Higgins, and H. L.
Murphy in the several cases.
Sir John Simon, l(. C.; Inskip, K. C., and Balloch for
the shipowners.
1922, February 10. The judgment of their lordships
was delivered byof
Lord SuMNER: These are consolidated appeals from the
of president's judgment rejecting the clain1s of the appellant
company for release with compensation and conden1ning
the vessels in question, the Blonde, the Prosper, and the
Hercules. They were small German steamers, two under
18 The record (pp. 34 to 65) contained an affidavit by the procurator general which is of
historical value. It set out, with particulars as to dates and statistics, misconduct by
Germany under the following heads: (a) sinking by submarines of merchant ships
(including passenger ships) and fishing vessels, without warning and with consequent
loss of civilian lives, including women and children; (b) sinking by submarines of hospital
ships with loss of life; (c) bombardment of undefended coastal towns by naval forces;
(d) air raids on undefended towns and cities with loss of civilian inhabitants; (e) promiscuous laying of mines and consequent sinking of neutral and other ships; (f) compulsion
of population of occupied territories to take part in military operations against their
country; (g) deportation, enforced labour, and unjustifiable penalties inflicted on those
populations; (h) use of poison gas and liquid fire. Provisions of the Hague conventions,
1899 and 1907, which werei nfringed by the above acts were set out in the affidavit.
11 U.Slfi)
nra.nch, 388. 422.
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800 and one under 1,100 tons gross, which at the out-

break of the war happened to be in London and Liverpool,
and were seized and proceeded against in prize. Orders
\Xlere in due course made for their detention in the form
which was settled in The Chile, 2 and followed in many
cases during the war. Shortly afterv.rards they were
requisitioned by order of the court for the use of His
Majesty, and passed into the service of the admiralty.
Two have since been lost while under requisition-the
Blonde by grounding off Flamborough Head, and the
Hercules through being struck by an enemy torpedo.
The Prosper still remained in the hands of the Cro,vn
under the requisition order at the time when the case
was heard.
The appellants are a shipping company registered and
carrying on business at Danzig, where the ships also were
registered, and at the qutbreak of war they owned a
number of the shares in each vessel, though not all;
but they have been throughout treated as the full o'vners
for all present purposes. Danzig having become a free
city under the treaty of Versailles, the appellants, as
citizens of Danzig, claim to be in a better position in
these proceedings than if they had still been subj~cts of
the German Empire, and no point has been taken on
behalf of His Majesty's procurator general that, as
Danzig 'vas not a party to The Hague conventions, citizens
of Danzig should not be allowed to claim the benefit of
them. All that is said is that, in respect of Germany's
actions during the war, the appellants, as they enjoyed
the benefit, must also take the burden, although, as
regards disabilities and liabilities imposed on Germany by
the terms of the treaty of Versailles, they may escape,
having ceased to be Germans at the moment when the
treaty first became operative. The principal point is
one turning on The Hague conventions of 1907, which,
though not argued below owing to some misunderstanding as to the state of the authorities, must be dealt 'vith
on one or other of the present groups of appeals. The
appellants claim the benefit of the sixth convention, or
in the alternative of a supposed agreement to the like
effect, arrived at ad hoc by Great Britain and Germany
in the early months of the war. The procurator o-eneral
denies that the sixth Hague convention ever beca~e ap, [1914] p. 212.
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plicable, first, for want of ratification by all the belligerents, and secondly, because article 1, on which the
appellants rest their claim, would only apply if Great
Britain had put article 2 in force, "\Vhich never was done.
As to the supposed agreement ad hoc, he says that the
negotiations were entered into for other purposes and,
further, broke down without conclusion.
gr~c~~r or days of
The history of the matter is this. Early in August,
1914, pursuant to an order in council of August 4, a
proclamation wait issued, which declared that German
ships in British ports would be detained, but that l-Iis
Majesty proposed ultimately to apply the sixth Hague
convention, provided that a secretary of state certified
before midnight of August 7, that he was satisfied, from
communications received, that Germany had expressed
a similar intention. This period expired without the
receipt of any sufficient communication, and the fact
was duly intimated to the admiralty. Thereupon, it is
said, the sixth Hague convention, so far as Great Britain
and Germany were concerned, failed to come into operation, and accordingly the provisions of article 2 had
no effect in the late war.
DiplomaticcorIn spite of this notice to the admiralty, communirespondence.
cations passed between the two powers through the good
offices of the diplomatic service of the United States.
Letters and telegrams were exchanged, and sometimes
they crossed one another. The German Government
were concerned not merely as to the treatment of detained ships under the sixth convention, but also as to
that of the crews under the eleventh. They asked
whether His Majesty's Government intended to observe
the provisions of these conventions, and in what sense
they understood some of their obscurer terms. By the
end of September or the beginning of October both parties
had stated distinctly that the sixth convention would be
observed, and had expressed their construction of it, in
senses which were substantially identical. As to the
eleventh, though not far apart, it does not appear, on
the documents which are forthcoming, that they "\vere
ever in absolute accord. Their lordships were not infornled that His Majesty's Government ever published
this correspondence at the time as the formal record of a
ne'v agreement therein arrived at.
The learned president came to the conclusion that this
correspondence, vie,ved as a negotiation fo~· a final agree-

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

ment, never passed beyond the stage of mere negotiation,
the discussions as to the two conventions not being
severable and no agreement having been arrived at as
to the eleventh convention. The contrary was strenuously urged before their lordships. Logically, however,
there is a prior issue-namely, whether this correspondence wa~ entered upon or was pursued as a negotiation
in tended to lead to a ne\V in tern a tional agreement at all:
The treaties and conventions which courts of prize are
accustomed to construe and give effect to are written
instruments duly executed and ratified. It is a novelty
to call on them to spell out such an agreement from a
series of messag~s passing to and fro. Here there is not
so much as a protocol, and although no doubt consensus
ad idem is fundamentally necessary to an international
agreement, as it would be to a private offer and acceptance under municipal la,~, it does not follo\v that in the
intercourse of sovereign States every interchange of
messages, some formal and some informal, should be
deemed to result in a new and binding agreement as soon
as the parties have reached the stage of affirming identical
propositions. Each power was anxious to know the
intentions of the other, and in their lordships' opinion
their object, and their sole object, was to ascertain
whether and in what way effect would be given to the old
agreement-namely, the sixth I-Iague convention, and
was not to enter into a new agreen1ent dealing with the
same subject and tending to the same effect, b~t concluded under conditions as embarrassing· and with a
result as superfluous as could be imagined.
It is true that expressions are to be found on the German
side, in the latter part of these co.m munications as well as
at the outset, which are not inappropriate to a negotiation
for, and to the conclusion of, a new agreement. The German Government in August states its acceptance of a
British proposition to release merchant ships, made in the
order in council of August 4, and in Octoher declares that
"there now exists between the German Government and
Great Britain an agreement as to the treatment of merchant ships." These expressions \Vere not, ho\vever,
adopted by His Majesty's Governn1ent. They throughout stated their intention to abide by the sixth Hague
convention, provided Germany \Vould do the same, and
there are dispatches from Germany at the end of Auaust
and in September \vhich show that this, \vhich \vaso the
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real aspect of the matter, was fully recognized by the
German Government. The language of the communications, when carefully examined, does not support but
displaces the theory that a new agreement was·in negotiation between belligerents to effect what could have been
better secured by rlciprocal recognition of a convention,
to which both parties had adhered while they were still
at peace.
In the result His Majesty's Government became satisfied that there existed on the German Government's part
such an intention to observe the convention reciprocally
as justified them in proceeding publicly to observe the
convention for their own part, and thenceforward orders
were made in the prize court, at the instance of the Crown,
which were always regarded as being framed to carry out
the obligations of the sixth Hague convention, while
securing the interests of this country in the possible event
of Germany's failing at the conclusion of the war to be of
the same mind as to her obligations as that which had
been manifested at the beginning. Their lordships may
further observe that, on balance of the importance of the
German merchant ships detained by Great Britain against
that of British merchant ships detained by Germany, the
latter power had a strong material interest in continuing
to execute the convention to the end, and was little likely
to intend to abandon or to desire to forfeit the ultimate
advantages, which observance of the convention would
assure. It therefore becomes necessary to consider in
what the obligations of that convention consist according
to its terms.
Applicability ot
Article 6. .of the sixth convention of 1907
declares that
sixth Hague con.
vention.
"the proVIsions of the present convention do not apply
except between contracting powers, and then only if all
the belligerents are parties to the convention." The
French text for the last part of this sentence reads: "et
seulement si les belligerants sont tous parties a la convention," and there may be significance in the different
positions in the sentence occupied by the respective
words "all" and "to us." Of the po,vers belligerent in
some theater or other and against one combination of
opponents or another during the late war, Serbia and
Montenegro never ratified the convention in question.
The United States 'vere not parties to it at all. At the
time when the ships no'v under discussion were first detained, Germany had not declared war on Serbia, nor

EFFECT OF NONRATIFICATION

had Serbia become formally the ally of Great Britain,
and, so far as their lordships are aware, actual hostile
action by Germany against Serbia and actual military
support to Serbia by Great Britain both belong to later
stages in the war. A nice question arises, therefore,
whether· Serbia was a belligerent in such a sense that her
failure to ratify the convention prevents its being applicable as between Germany and Great Britain in the
matter of these ships~ If the position of Serbia does
not prevent the obligations of the convention from attaching, still less can this result from that of the United
States, who were not one of the "contracting powers."
To put the point otherwise, are the ''belligerents," who
are to be taken account of for t_h e purposes of this article,
the belligerents merely who detain or suffer detention, or ·
are they all th~ powers who are simultaneously engaged
in war, whether acting in alliance or in direct conflict
with one another or not~ Is the adherence of all the
belligerents, however remote from each other or unconnected with the ships and their detention, the consideration for the attaching of the obligation of apy one of
them, or are the mutual promises of the powers concerned-that is, of the detainer and the detained-a sufficient consideration to bind them both together~ M utuality is of the essence of the convention. Is that mutuality complete if the detaining sovereign and the
sovereign of the ships detained ratify and abide by the
convention, or is it imperfect, so as to prevent the application of the convention, unless and until other powers
in no way concerned in the ships or their fortunes, but
merely connected with one or both of those sovereigns
in the general war, have like,vise ratified and likewise
abided by the convention, whether or no they have ships
or harbors, and whether or no they make or suffer captures or are ever directly affected by maritime war at all~
It is very hard to credit that the operation of an agreement, so earnestly directed to the attainment of the
highest practical ends in "\Var, should have been deliberately made to depend on the accidents or the procrastinations of diplomatic procedure in time of peace, even
"\Vhen no real relation existed between the condition and
the consequence, between the ratification of all the parties
and the detention of the ships of one of them. rrheir
lordships, hov1ever, have not found it necessary to give
a final ans"\ver to these questions. Whether in the
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circumstances of these cases the convention was applicable
or whether it might be successfully objected that it had
never become applicable, the result is the same, for ~he
objection is clearly one that can be waived, and in their
lordships' opinion it was waived by His Majesty's
Government, alike by the 'vhole tenor of the abovementioned correspondence and by the whole attitude
of the Crown in matters of prize affecting such cases as
these throughout the war. De facto as well as de jure
the position of Serbia and the other powers, as regards
both the convention and the conduct of the "\Var, waswell known to His Majesty's Government at all material
times. Yet days of grace were in fact allowed to Austrian
ships by proclamation dated August 15, 1914, as to which
see The Turul. 18 The Chile 5 order was wholly inept if
the convention had and could have no application, and
the Crown should have applied to the court not for leave
to requisition, but for decrees of condemnation. The
fact that, in spite of the doubt expressed by Sir Samuel
Evans, P., in The .Mowe10, the Crown acquiesced in
numerous orders in that form and never asked for condemnation of these detained ships so long as hostilities
lasted, is conclusive to show that any right to rely on the
nonfulfilment of article 6 was waived. The arguments of
the attorney general on behalf of the Crown in the case
of The GutenjeU; 19 and Procurator in Egypt v. Deutsches
Kohlen Depot 20 are of especial importance in this connection.
In construing such an international instrument as that
now in question, it is profitable to bear in mind from the
outset sundry considerations, which are not the less
important for being doubtless somewhat obvious. It
result~ from deliberations among the representatives of
many powers, in 'vhich none can expect 'vithout some
concession to insist upon his country's interests, its language, or its law. It is expressed in 'vhat is by tradition
the common language of international intercourse, but
it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to expect
of it either nicety of scholarship or exactitude of literary
idiom. Neither the municipal law nor the technical
terms of the negotiating countries can be expected to find
[1914] p. 212.
[1915] p. 1, 12.
1s [1919] A. C. 515.
6

1g

10

2o

[1916] 2 A. C. 112, 115.
[1919] A. C. 291, 292.
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a place in its provisions. Where interests conflict, much
must be allowed to the effects of compromise; 'vhere the
principles, by which future action is to be guided, are
laid down broadly, leaving to the powers concerned the
actual measures to be taken in execution of those principles, it is unreasonable to expect a greater precision than
the circumstances admit of, or to reject as incomplete
provisions which are expressed without much detail and
sometimes only in outline.
On the other hand, it is specially necessary to discover
and to give effect to all the beneficent intentions 'vhich
such instruments embody and which their general tenor
indicates. It is impossible to suppose, whatever the
imperfections of their phrasing, that the framers of such
instruments should have intended any power to escape
its obligations by a quibbling interpretation, by a merely
pedantic adherence to particular words, or by emphasizing the absence of express 'vords, 'vhere the sense to
be implied from the purport of the convention is reasonably plain. Least of all can it be supposed that His
Majesty's Government could have become parties to
such an instrument in any narrow sense, such as 'vould
reserve for them future loopholes of escape from its
general scope.
Turning to articles 1 and 2 of the sixth Hague convention, it is important to remember that, before its date,
and since its date whenever it is not in force, the law of
nations permitted and entitled a belligerent to make
prize of an enemy merchantman found within his ports
at the outbreak of war (Lindo v. Rodney 21 ). It is true
that : n several instances during the nineteenth century
belligerents mitigated the rigour of the rule and granted
days of grace for the free departure of such vessels. 'l'he
practice was certainly"modern, but it was neither uniform
nor universal, and on each occasion it rested with the
belligerent to elect 'vhether the rule recognized by the
la'v of nations should be mitigated or not. It is not
surprising that the negotiators of 1907 got no further than
agreeing that permission to depart freely, within a time
to be fixed by the po,ver entitled to capture, was a thing
desirable indeed, but not obligatory.
Under these circumstances it is asked 'vith much force:
Why should po,vers, who could not agree that days of
21

2 Doug. 612n.
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grace should be given at all, find themselves able to concur in a more extensive modification of the law then
existing and to agree that ships, unable to avail themselves of permission to depart, should not be made prize
but should only be detained~ The argument fiQds some
support in the fact that the article dealing with days of
grace precedes that limiting the right to such condemnation, and in the further fact that article 2 certainly is
closely allied \vith article 1 and is so far dependent on it
that instead of stating the circumstances in which it
applies, as a self-contained article might be expected to
do, it finds their definition only in a reference to the first
article and to those circumstances mentioned in it, which
depend on the choice and the clemency of the capturing
power. Why, then, should powers, which fail to agree
to such a modification of belligerent right as is involved
in the grant of days of grace, be deemed capable of the
graver modification which is involved in abandoning the
right to capture and being intent with a right to detain~
The true question, however, is not why they should
have but whether they have done so, and it may be usefully met, if not completely answered, by asking another.
. The powers, great and small, assembled at The Hague in
1907 in what was undoubtedly a great effort, involving
mutual concessions and separate sacrifices, to regulate
and to humanize the practices of maritime war. Is it
consistent with their dignity or with the seriousness of the
negotiations to read a part of their handi\vork as meaning
that a belligerent need not spare an enemy ship in his
own port at all unless he chooses, but that, if from good
nature or improvidence, he waives his right to bar her
exit absolutely, he is to be bound by convention to do
more than he chooses to do by express grace, and may
then only detain, when otherwise he could seize 1 To
say that the compact expressed in article 2 has been providently entered into in case two belligerents should reciprocally grant days of grace under article 1, but that until
that event happens it is a mere foretaste of things to
come, is to attenuate this convention to the very verge of
annulling it. It is all the more un\vorthy of such an
occasion to place so narrow a meaning on the article,
because the length and character of the opportunity for .
departing in peace rests entirely with the grantor of it.
In itself a concession requiring immediate departure
differs only notionally from a belligerent act inhibiting
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departure altogether. Is the modification of belligerent
right to take place only in the one case and not ·in the
other~ and, if so, on what show of reason can it be
founded or to what inveterate prejudice or ingrained
self-interest has so illogical an arrangement been conceded~

Articles 3 and 4, however, which are strictly in pari
materia, seem to place the matter beyond doubt. Articles 3 and 4,
Article 3 contains no reference to articles 1 and 2. It
deals with a case to which days of grace and opportunities of departure have no application-that is, to
ships that are found by their enemy at sea on the outbreak of war. The argument is unaffected by the fact,
that as to this article Germany made reservations at the
t"ime when the convention was ratified, for the effect of
the reservation is limited to the article with which it
deals. A reservation as ,to a part of the convention is
quite consistent with adoption of the rest of it. The
article, clearly and indepe;ndently of the others, requires
that such ships, though by the law of nations good
prize, may not be confiscated-that is, seized and brought
before a court of prize for condemnation. They may
only be detained-of course, under the order of such a
court and upon conditions imposed by it. Further,
when article 4 comes to deal with cargo on board "vessels
referred to in articles 1 and 2," it prescribes the same
measure of liability as that laid down in article 3, and
describes that prescription as being an identical principle. Their lordships, therefore, think it clear that in
effect this convention says: "Ships which find themselves at the outbreak of war in an enemy port shall in
no case be condemned, if they are not allowed to leave,
or if they unavoidably overstay their days of grace, but
it would be better that they should always be allowed to
leave, with or without days of grace." In effect, \vhile
article 1 is only optional, article 2 is obligatory. They
rsject the construction which makes the prohibition
upon confiscation depend on a prior election to do what
article 1 desiderates but does not require.
Assuming
that the sixth conventio-n was bindin()'b on man
Effect of Ger•
•
method of
this country In the early stages of the war in such a sense conducting war.
as would preyent the condemnation of these vessels
at the end of it, the procurator general further contends
that during its progress Germany has by her conduct
given this country the right to refuse to be bound any
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further by its terms so far as German ships are concerned. It appears that in 1915, though the fact did
not become known to His Majesty's Government till
afterwards, the German foreign office instructed the
German diplomatic officials in Spain to inform the
owners of these detained ships of the arrival of any of
them in Spanish ports when navigating under requisition.
The object of this instruction seems to have been to
give the owners the opportunity of taking proceedings
in Spanish courts, if so advised, for recovering possession
of them in Spanish waters under judgments pronounced
for the purpose. It does not appear whether any such
proceedings were ever taken, or, if so, with what result.
Furthermore, in correspondence with the Government of
the King of Siam the German foreign office had advanced,
as a ground for refusing to be bound by the eleventh
Hague convention, that it had never been ratified by all
the then belligerent powers. Finally, it was contended
that the many outrageous and indefensible measures
adopted by Germany during the war, and especially her
defiance of the Hague conventions applicable, natably
by the use of poisonous gas and of contact mines, by
the destruction of hospital ships, the deportation and
forced employment of civilians, and the bombardment
of open towns, amounted to an intimation that she
intended to repudiate all obligations, and especially all
conventional obligations, as to the conduct of war, and
thus gave to Great Britain the right to treat herself as
released from her correlative obligation under the sixth
Hague convention of 1907. There are two obvious
fta-\vs in this argument. First, so far as concerns the
intentions of Germany she may have flagrantly disregarded obligations which fettered her freedom of action
to her disadvantage. It does not necessarily follow that
she intended to repudiate a convention under which she
stood to gain largely in the long run. There is, in fact,
no evidence of any conduct on Germany's part down to
the conclusion of the armistice which put it out of her
power to return detained ships in pursuance of article 2.
Secondly, so far as concerns the consequent rights of
this country, even if the rules of English municipal la'v
as to the discharge or dissolution of contracts be applicable to a case arising between sovereign po,vers, repudiation by Germany could do no more than give to this
country the right to accept that repudiation and to treat
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the convention as no longer binding. There is no evi·dence whatever that this was ever done; indeed it is
plain that His Majesty's Government continued, do,vn
to the conclusion of hostilities and even to the conclusion
of peace, to treat this convention as binding. Most, if
not all, of the Ohile orders had been made by the end
of 1916, since which date, as well as before it, Inost of
the facts now relied upon were notorious, yet no step
was taken to obtain a "further order" in any case, and
it is to be observed that the reason for making provision
for a "further order" was not doubt as to the declared
intentions of Germany 'vith regard to recognition of the
convention, but uncertainty as to the continuance of
that intention on her part. If so, in the language of
the English cases, the contract was kept alive for the
benefit of both parties, since one party can not of his
o'vn choice put an end to it by disregarding its obligations, and so long as the contract subsists, each party
can claim the fulfilment of the provisions which are in
his favor, just as he remains bound to answer for his
disregard of obligations \vhich he ought to satisfy.
Their lordships, ho,vever, do not rest their conclusions
on rules applicable to private contracts in English courts.
The principle of ascertaining the intention of the parties
to an agree1nent by giving due consideration to what
they have said is no doubt valid in international matters,
but there are many rules both as to the formation, the
interpretation and the discharge of contracts, which can
not be transferred indiscriminately from municipal la\V
to the law of nations. They prefer to rely on a \vider
ground. It is not the function of a court of prize, as
such, to be a censor of the general conduct of a belligerent,
apart from his dealings in the particular matters which
come before the court, or to sanction disregard of solemn
obligatio& by one belligerent, because it reprehends the
whole behavior of the other. Reprisals afford a legitimate mode of challenging and restraining misconduct,
to \vhich, when confined within recognized limits and
embodied in due form, a court of prize is bound to give
effect. In a matter, however, which turns on the obligation of a single and severable compact, the court must
inquire whether that very compact has been discharged,
and ought not to be guided by considerations arising
only out of the general conduct of 'var. 'I'heir lordships
are clearly of opinion that neither in regard to the in-
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structions given to the German Embassy in Madrid,
\vhich were after all a domestic matter and were at most
a threat never communicated by Germany to His
Majesty's Government; nor to the answer given to the
Government of the King of Siam, which not only was
res inter alios acta but related to a separate convention
and proved nothing as to the German Government's
intention to observe Convention VI.,; nor in regard to
the general delinquencies of the German forces during
the war, is it possible to find juridical grounds for releasing His Majesty's Government from their obligations
under the sixth Hague convention, when once they had
attached. It has not even been sho\vn that on the termination of the war Germany was not willing to return
such British ships as she had detained, in so far as they
had not been previously released under the armistice or
other,vise.
Orders of re·
It would follow from the foregoing considerations that
lease.
the owners of the vessels in question would be entitled
to orders of release, but no\V arise the difficulties, that of
these vessels only one survives, and that all matters
occurring during the war are, as bet,veen German
claimants and the procurator general, now to be considered in the light of the treaty of Versailles.
Compensation.
Article 2 of the sixth convention, after prescribing that
the belligerent's right is limited to detention of the ship
"under an obligation of resto1ing it after the war \vithout
compensation," proceeds: "or he may requisition it on
condition of paying compensation." What is this compensation, and when and in what events is it to be paid?
The question is material, because during the period of
requisitioning the Blonde was lost by perils of the sea,
without fault on the part of any one responsible, and the
Hercules can not now be restored because the German
combatant forces themselves destroyed her, purporting
to do so as a legitimate act of war. The provision is that
a detained vessel is simply to be restored '\vithout compensation. Nothing is said to impose on the belligerent
any duty to provide for her safety or to effect repairs. If
he restores her, he does so '\vithout compensation, and
meantime she has been detained at her o'\vners' risk.
Next, the belligerent is given an express right to requisition, but on condition of paying compensation. Whether
requisition has the same meaning in the convention that
it has in Order XXIX, or whether, in addition to the
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right to use, it includes a right to appropriate, are
questions not now material; for present purposes it is
sufficient to assume that the meaning of the word in
both instruments is the same. While on the one hand
nothing is stipulated as to payment of freight or of compensation for the use of the ship while under requisition
and nothing is expressed as to repairs, on the other hand,
a-part fron1 circumstances which discharge the requisitioning government from all the obligations of the convention, the exerci3e of the right to requisition during
detention involves that, if she is not restored at all, compensation takes her place, and for this purpose her money
value, \vhen requisitioned, is the obvious substitute for
the ship herself in specie.
It is no doubt paradoxical that, the ship having been·
la\vfully requisitioned by the Admiralty without any
obligation to pay for using her or for the consequences
of mere use, His ~viajesty's Government should be called
on to compensate her German owners, because the
German forces have sunk her by an illegitimate act of
'var. The question, however, is one of construction of
the article. It begins by· substituting detention for
confiscation, thus insuring to the owner the right to get
his ship back, so far as the detaining belligerent is concerned. On this is engrafted a proviso for the benefit
of the belligerent, of which he may avail himself or not as
he pleases, and this proviso imposes on him an unqualified condition-that of compensation. This must
be read literally, and as nothing further is prescribed
in favor of the detaining belligerent, he can not have the
benefit of exceptions by implication. The convention
says that requisitioning is to be on condition of paying
a compensation; the condition would be frustrated if,
though the obligations of the convention had not been
terminated, neither ship nor compensation \Vere forth:coming.
The convention furthermore does not define the compensation, or the mode of calculating it, or the time of
payment. These are matters \vhich it leaves for subsequent determination, and it is reasonable to infer that
at any rate the determination of the court of prize,
before \vhich the vessel in question has been duly brought
is within the purvie\V of the convention. Accordingly,
if the recognized procedure as to requisitioning has been
follo\ved, as \Vas done in the present case, and if that
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procedure provides for the subst1tution of money for the
ship~ that money can not be regarded as being other than
the compensation to which the article applies. Under
the prize rules and orders the court can allo\v the ship-,
which is in the custody of its marshal, to be requisitioned
by the Crown, and in the course of such requisitioning to.
be necessarily exposed to maritime and belligerent
hazards. This involves the court's parting with the
custody and with the immediate control. For the·
security of the owner the court may require the deposit
or a binding undertaking for the deposit in court of the
ship's appraised value, and although the court by no
means parts with its control over the ship for all purposes, or precludes itself altogether from ordering her
redelivery, it treats the fund for all ordinary purposes as
the subject on which subsequent decrees will operate.
The advantage to the owner is obvious. This procedure
substitutes for such a wasting asset as a ship, \vhi0h in
either event he can not use, a money fund in court, 'vhich
possesses a relative stability and suffers no 'vear and
tear. Their lordships' conclusion is that under the
sixth convention the subjects to be restored are the
Prosper, being a ship which is in specie, and the appraised values of the Blonde and Hercules, which were
lost. No question as to freight was raised before their
lordships.
A further point may be briefly disposed of. It was.
that in all cases where a ship is requisitioned other\vise
than "temporarily" under rule 6 of Order XXIX, the
substitution of the appraised value for the ship is definitive, and no order can thereafter be made to take the
ship herself out of the possession of the Ad1niralty. There
is no authority for this. It is not supported by the
special provision for a temporary, as distinguished from a
general and indeterminate, requisitioning, 'vhich 'vas
only introduced by amendment into Order XXIX some
considerable time after the beginning of the 'var, nor
does the provision that such requisitioning may be without
appraisement preclude the po,ver of ordering appraisement, 'vhen on the destruction of the vessel it becon1es
necessary that a fund should be determined 'vhich \vill
represent her. It is opposed to the nature of requisitioning, \vhich is for the use of His ~1ajesty (including, no·
doubt, consumption in the case of goods "-hose normal
usc consists in using the1n up), and \Vould confound a.
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thing requisitioned for use with a thing acquired for the
purpose of sale. Furthermore, in cases where release
in specie is the right of a claimant, the court might prove
to have disabled itself from making the due decree, if a
mere order for leave to requisition were to operate as a
final abandonment to the Crown. Apart from the treaty
of Versailles, their lordships conclude that the Prosper
must, as a matter of form, be restored by the Admiralty to
the custody of the marshal, in order that she may be
released to the o\vners in specie.
.
The provisions of the treaty of Versailles, which are saJI~~ty of
invoked to the contrary, are t¥.rofold. There can be no
doubt that. Germany v1as competent, on behalf of those
nationals who were Gern1an subjects \Vi thin the operation
of the treaty, to make cessions which would bind them
and effect a transfer of their rights of property, as if the
cession had been made personally by the owner concerned.
By article 1 of annex 3 of Part VIII of the treaty Germany ceded to the allied and associated powers all vessels
of 1, 600 tons gross and upward and a part of those
under 1,600 tons_, and by paragraph 8 she further" waived
all claims of any description against the allied and associated governments or their nationals in respect of the
detention, employ1nent, loss or damage of any German
ships," \Vith an exception not no\V material. By article
440 Germany further recognized as valid and binding
all decrees and orders concerning German ships and goods
made by any prize court of any of the allied and associated
powers.
In their lordship's opinion, while annex 3 operates to 1 .i'o8~~~~~
transfer the property in all ships of 1,600 tons gross and
upward, it makes no such transfer in the case of ships of
less tonnage, at least until they have been selected for
surrender as part of those which under the treaty are to
be handed over. It is not suggested that the vessels in
question have been so selected, and accordingly in their
case this provision of the treaty does not affect the
owners' rights to restoration in specie. Had they been
over 1,600 tons, the property and rights of the o\vners
would have been transferred by the operation of the
treaty and they would have had no locus standi to
appeal against any order dealing with them or \vith the
money in court or to be brought into court after appraisement in substitution for them. Article 1 of the annex 3
to Part VIII, being a cession by the German Government, "so as to bind all other persons interested," not
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only binds the German shipowners as persons interested
in appraised values brought into or to be brought into
court, but also binds them in respect of their property
in the ships, which, until duly divested by a decree
having that effect, remains in them, even though it may
be liable to be divested at any time; accordingly it would
be an answer both in regard· to detained ships still in
specie, whether remaining in the custody of the court
or under requisition, and to the funds, which. represent
them under the practice of the court.
Their lordships further think that paragraph 8 does
not affect the matter. It would be otherwise if the
appraised value were regarded, not as a substitution for
the requisitioned res, taking its place when lost, but as
a payment in consideration of being allowed to requisition at all, for in that case there might be a claim, which
paragraph 8 would bar. Their lordships, however, reject
this view. The owners of these detained ships have no
claim against His Majesty's Government either for detaining or for using the vessels. Both were regular proceedings taken as of right under regular decrees the
validity of which Germany recognizes by the treaty of
peace. The loss of the vessels gave no claim, for the ·
owners' rights a~ise not out of the loss but out of the
substitution of the appraised values for the ships, the
release of which is the indemnity which the convention
provides for. There is, therefore, in this case nothing
to waive.
The treaty of Versailles contains a further provision
(art. 297) not specially applicable to shipping by which
the allied and associated powers reserve the right to
retain and liquidate ·all property within their territories
belonging to German nationals or companies controlled
by them at the date of the coming into force. of the treaty,
the liquidation to be carried out in accordance 'vith the
laws of the allied or associated state concerned. It has
been urged on the · one hand and denied on the other
that an answer can be found to the claim of the Danziger
Rederci Aktien-Gesellschaft for the release of these vessels in the application of · this article to the ships and
funds in question. Beyond observing that the contentions raised on both sides deserve full and careful consideration by the appropriate tribunal, their lordships do
not feel called upon to express any opinion about them,
for they are satisfied that the prize court is not such a
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tribunal. Nor do the terms of the armistice affect the
matter. It is enough to say that article 30, which was
cited, doss not purport to touch the obligations of the
Crown under the sixth Hague convention, when duly determined by a court of prize, whether before or after
the conclusion of hostilities. It merely put it out of
the po"\\Ter of Germany, when delivering the ships demanded, to insist on an anticipation of the actual end
of the war by delivery of the detained German shipR
forthwith.
As soon as the conclusion has been arrived at that
under the treaty obligations of 1907 this country is bound
to restore the res, whether now existing in specie or only
n the form of a substituted fund, the duty of the prize
court prima facie is to give effect to that obligation and
thereby to discharge itself and its officials from further
custody of or control over it. The decision of course
involves ar_ duty to ascertain that the private party claiming is a party presently entitled, who has not, by his own
act or by the public act of those \vho bind him, been
divested of his rights of owner~hip or of possession.
Where rights and claims arise out of the way in which the
prize has been dealt with prior to the decree for its release
and the execution of that decree, no doubt the prize
court retains its jurisdiction over them, notwithstanding
that the res no longer remains in its custody. Here, however, there is no such case. Whatever rights may have
been r_eserved to His Majesty, as one of the allied and
associated powers, to liquidate these ships or their value, ·
they have not, so far as their lordships have been informed, been hitherto put in force. The right referred to
is not the right, existing independently of and prior to the
convention of 1907, to claim condemnation of these ships
in prize in accordance with the law of nations, nor is the
reservation of it equivalent to the discharge of the restrictions, which the sixth convention imposes. It is a right
to liquidate in accordance 'vith municipal law, that is to
say a ne\v right, which does not become effective unless
and until it is exercised. If this were to be done hereafter,
it would be a new act not arising out of dealings with the
prize as prize, not modifying the rights of ownership as
they now exist, and therefore it would be cognizable by
some other tribunal. Their lordships are clearly of
opinion that the treaty of Versailles, which neither names
33474-251--11
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nor seems to consider the sixth Hague convention, does
not in this article modify or annul the obligations \vhich
arise under it. So much they decide, but no more: the
rest is open and, apparently, in accordance '\\rith the terms
29 ~ffect of article of article 297, is cognizable by the high court of justice.
As this potential claim has been brought to their lordships' attention, they think that under any order of
release the res should not be removed out of British territory for a reasonable time, lest otherwise the treaty right
might be defeated; but they see no reason for delaying the
grant of a decree for release, since no ground remains for
continuing the responsibilities of the prize court or prolonging its possession. The right course will be to
release the res physically to the public trustee as custodian of enemy property, or to such other officer as may be
discharging such duties, to be retained by him for a
reasonable time free of expense to the claimants, say for
six months, in order that the Cro\vn may have the opportunity of commencing proceedings if so advised, and in
that case further until the final determination of those
proceedings, but in any other case to be thereafter forthwith delivered up to the claimants.
It is unnecessary to express any opinion as to the
appellants' claim to a special position as a company
registered in and under the la"\vs of the Free City of
Danzig except as to one point. It was urged that a
court of prize can condemn only as against an enemy
subject. Conceding that the power is exercisable after
·the conclusion of peace, it \Vas said only to apply to those
whose allegiance or citizenship is the same as it \Vas
before that time, though peace has converted enmity into
amity; hence as against the subject of a ne\vly constituted
State, though formerly they were German, the right to
condemn has ceased. The contention was not rested
on any authority, nor was it explained why proceedings
which were regular from the beg~nning should be frustrated as against the captors by a stipulation in the
treaty, which does not deal with their rights but is
directed to another and a very different object. Their
lordships think the contention groundless.
Derision.
In the result the appeals succeed with costs; the
decrees of condemnation should be set aside; the matter
should be remitted to the prize court to make such orders
as may be necessary for the appraisement of the Blonde
and the Hercules, and to make a decree releasing those
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appraised values and the Prosper in specie to the custodian of enemy property to be delivered up to the
claimant~, if after the lapse of six months no proceedings
have been begun for an order for delivery up to the
Cro\vn but other\vise to abide the final determination
of such' proceedings. There is also an appeal by leave
from the president's refusal of a rehearing, as to \vhich
nothing need be said beyond formally dismissing it.
Their lordships will ·hun1bly advise His Majesty , accordingly.
The Rabenfels, the Werdenfels, the Lauterfels, the Aenne 1 ,~~~~~
Riclcm-ers, the Gutenfels, the Barenfels, the Prinz Adalbert,
the J(ronprinsessin Cecilie.
In these cases their lordships, at various dates in the
earlier part of the \var, made orders on appeal that the
ships should be detained until further order. 22 All were
over 1,600 tons.
The owners in the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth
no\v petition that orders be made for the release of such
as remain and for pay1nent of the appraised values of
such as are lost, \vhile the Crov1n petitions in all that
orders condemning both may be made.
The relevant considerations have been fully dealt \vith
in the case of the Blonde and other ships. In the case
of ships of this size the treaty of Versailles operates as
a transfer of the former O\\rners' rights, nor have they
any locus standi before the board to discuss how the
allied and associated po\vers may deal \Vith them inter
se. The petitions for release should be dismissed with
costs.
As their lordships understand that I-Iis Majesty's
Government have come to arrangements \Vith the allied
and associated powers \vith regard to the shipping surrendered and transferred under the treaty, and that no
question no\v arises as bet,veen them in relation thereto,
they think that the proper course is to discharge the
orders for detention previously advised by their lordship~; and to release the vessels to the Cro\vn as thepresent O\vner.
Their lordships will humbly advise I-Iis Majesty accordingly.
Solicitors for shipo\vners (appellants and on petitions) :.
Bot terell & Roche.
Solicitor for procura.tor general: Treasury solieitor.
n E.g. [1916] 2 A. C . 112; [1918] A. C. W O and .50ln.
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THE "ZUIDERZEE" AND THE "GOUWZEE"
April 27, 1917
([1] Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 305) ·

In the prize matter concerning the Dutch steam tugs
.Zuiderzee and the Gouwzee, together with four lighters,
the imperial superior prize court in Berlin in its session of
April 27, 1917, held as follows:
The appeals against the judgment of the pri~e court
in Hamburg of January 26, 1917, fail. The claimants to
bear the costs of the appeal.
Reasons:
On September 28, 1916, two tugs, the Dutch tug
of Zuiderzee, \vith the Belgian lighters, L' Avenir and Pays
theStatement
facts.
Bas, and the Dutch tug Gouwzee, 'vith the Dutch lighters
S. 0. 0. 17 and S. q. (}. 18, "\Vere stopped by German 'var
vessels and brought into Zebrugge. The lighters were
empty. The Belgian craft 'vere turned over to the
Marine Corps in Bruges in accordance with article 46,
section 2, of the Price Court Rules. The form of the
barges, which were being taken to London, is the distinct
build of the "Thames barges" as they are used in London Harbor.
In response to the published notice of the imperial
prize court in Hamburg, the following appearances were
made for the release of tl{e vessels and indemnification:
1. The firm of L. Smit '& Co., as owners, for the t'v<?
steam tugs.
2. The merchant, L. Letzer, formerly of Antwerp, no'v
of Rotterdam, for the Belgian lighter.
3. The Scheepvart en Steenkalen Co., of Rotterdam,
for the Dutch lighter.
The imperial prize court in Hamburg decreed the condemnation of all the craft and rejected the claims.
Against this decision the claimants have entered appeal.
The appeals fail.
"c~:tiat:n~.'~ s
The barges captured 'vith the t"\\'"O stean1 tugs are conditional contraband according to article 23, section 9, of
the Prize Code. Their destination 'vas London, and the
judge of first instance is of the opinion that the presumption of their destination for the enemy Government
or military force arising therefrom has not been disproved.
On this ground he reached the conclusion that not only
the barges themselves but the tugs as 'vell were liable to
condemnation. It is explained that the bar~es 'vere the
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only "consignment" (Beforderungsgegenstande) of the
tugs, and were to be considered as their ''cargo'' in the
sense of article 41, section 2, of the Prize Code. rrha t
they were not taken on board the steamer made no difference. According to the aim of the prize la\V, \vhich is to
prevent the "supply" of contraband to the enemy, that
does not matter. If certain provisions of the Prize Code
read as if the goods n1ust be on board the vessels, like
articles 35 and 36, there are other provisions again \Vhich
plainly denote that only the act of supplying is the
criterion, as articles 39 and 41.
The fact that it \Vould be absurd to treat a vessel
which, for instance, \Vas carrying parts of a submarine or
dock on board differently from a vessel which was conveying an entire boat or dock in to"\V to the enemy was
considered telling.
That m,ust be concurred in. Under the circumstances
here prevailing, where the barges \Ve~e then1s~l ves unladen, the legal question is not in doubt. According to
the statements of the claimants, it is established that to~~~e~ract
the barges were given over to the owners of the tugs
for delivery. According to a generally recognized principle of private law, this is the decisive element in establishing the legal position of to\vs. According to whether
the towed vessel has been intrusted to the master of
the tug for delivery to the recipient, or \Vhether title has
remained in the owners of the former, a contract of
freight; or a contract of towage, is presented, be it for
service or for work. Even granted that principles of
private law are not necessarily controlling for questions
of international law, yet in this case they have immediate
significance, inasmuch as the answer to the question of
what \Vas to be considered as the cargo of the vessel
can only be gathered from the agreement concerning
the goods made \vith the owner of the vessel, which
n1ust be interpreted ~n accordance with private la\v.
It is unnecessary to raise the question whether it \Vou]d
be different if goods had been taken aboard the lighters
for delivery to England at the same time, and if there
had been the further intention of bringing the barges
right back to Holland after the completion of the trip
and unloading.
Here it is only a question of the conveyance of the
barges themselves, which comprised the only elements
of the consignment. It is immaterial \Vhether the ship 's
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master sto,vs the goods intrusted to him in the hold or
on deck, 'vhether he suspends them from the sides of
the vessel, or whether he draws them along after him
or beside him through the water.
From the point of view of international law, the barges
were the goods and the cargo of the tug. Nor does the
application of article 41, section 2, of the Prize Code
0 ~~man Prize do violence to the text. The tugs are subject to condemnation in so far as the towed craft were contraband,
because they 'vere captured for "carriage" of contraband. On the other hand, article 33, section 2, of the
Prize Code has no application to the towed craft. It
provides that merchant vessels themselves are not to be
regarded as destined for the enemy forces, etc., for the
mere reason that they are en route to a fortified position
of the enemy. But the towed barges are not in this
case the "vessels themselves," but the" cargo." From
still another point of view, but for the same reasons, as
regards the lighters L' Avenir and Pays Bas, it iB not of
decisive significance that they are of Belgian, and hence
of enemy, nationality. For they are cargo, and enemy
cargo is protected by the neutral flag of the tug, provided
it is [not] contraband of war.
Presumptio~ of
Concerning this last question ' too ' the first ]. udge must
e n e m y destmabe concurred with. The legal presumption of enemy
tion.
destination arises against the lighters in vie'v of the place
to which they 'vere bound, and what the merchant
Letzer-to consider his claim next-has adduced in disproof of the presumption is 'vithout significance. The
assurances of the owners of the craft in litigation can
naturally pretend to only slight value as evidence. Nor
are the officials of the firm so disinterested that their
impartiality and trustworthiness are to be presuppos-ed
without further ado. Inherently, too, their declarations-including that which the claimant succeeded in
substantiating under No. 1-are futile, so far as ascribing
to them any decisive value as evidence is concerned. In
vain does one ask what induced the merchant, formerly
domiciled in Antwerp, 'vho no'v see1ns to have sought
refuge in Rotterdam, to transfer his business, or a part
thereof, to London. And even if the assu1nption is
doubtless in point, that at present there is much to be
earned in London vvith craft of this kind, yet it is equally
sure that the English military direction or the departments of civil government of the state stand in the first
rank as the best customers for means of transportation by
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water. If the actual facts remain unclear, even in regard
to what the claimant had only contemplated, it is "\Vholly
uncertain what the real state of affairs would have been
if the voyage of the lighters had succeeded. Therefore,
the legal presumption remains.
· Is
· t h e same WI·th th e c1a1m
· of th e Shipping
Claim of&Dutch
coal
F undamentall y, It
Dutch Shipping & Coal Co. They appear to ~ave an Co.
establishment in London in connection with their firm
which was transferred to England, and the lighters might
have been going to play their part in a business already
existing-one does not know, to be sure, how long it had
existed-of a definite character with business connections which had been established earlier. Here, too,
however, from what the claimant presents in the way of
proof, one gains no more than this general idea of the
possibilities presented. Nor can any conclusive weight
be given the fact that the transfer of the lighters to England was only permitted by the Government upon the
pledge of the owners to bring them home again within
six months, and after the English Government had
guaranteed that no objection would be raised thereto.
On this point the testimony is rendered nugatory by
the evidence. Only two, quite detached, statements in
writing Were presented in transcript.
If one is confronted at this stage by facts which are
fragmentary and which have not been cleared up, there
also fails to be any assurance that the pledges entered
into at the time of the transfer would have been kept on
all sides. The embarrassment of our enemy, as regards
tonnage of all kind, is too well known for one not to have
to consider the possibility that, with the consent of all
parties, and without any embarrassment arising for the
claimant vis-a-vis his government, the arrangement
might have been changed, as may even have been intended when the vessels were imported.
The case of craft of the sort in question, under the
prevailing circumstances, is one sui generis, and it can
not be decided according to the same rules which apply
to goods of other kinds, food, etc.
It is also remarkable that in the assurances of those affirmed.
Condemnation
who kno"\V from their own knowledge, only use for purposes of war is spoken of. Use by departments of the
English Government for other purposes, even limited to
the proposed period of six months, 'vould be conclusive
as to the contraband character of the vessels.
The judgment is affirmed.

